

**A Micro-level Approach to Armed Organizations:
Results of a Survey of Demobilized Guerrilla and Paramilitary Fighters in Colombia^{*}**

Ana M. Arjona and Stathis N. Kalyvas

Yale University

February 2008

Introduction

The existing literature on civil war that uses systematic data tends to focus on phenomena such as the origins, duration and termination of this type of conflicts at the macro level (e.g. Grossman 1995; Collier 1999; Collier et al 2000; Fearon 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Walter 1997). The empirical evidence on which these works rely usually consists of aggregated data, with the country as the unit of analysis. Even though this literature has identified key correlates of civil war onset such as low per-capita income, rough terrain, and natural resources, the conditions under which these factors lead to armed conflict, and the mechanisms through which they affect the decisions of the actors involved, are still poorly understood. Even more, the statistical results of these comparisons across countries seem not to be robust (Sambanis and Hegre 2006). In consequence, most of the questions that this literature has assessed are still open (Kalyvas 2007).

Research projects that theorize the decision-making process of the actors that are involved, and test alternative hypotheses on the basis of sound research designs, can make important contributions to the understanding of different phenomena that take place in the midst of civil war. However, one of the main obstacles for conducting research at the micro level is the dearth of systematic data. Given the difficulties involved in collecting data, most studies rely exclusively on anecdotal or ethnographic evidence.

In this context,¹ the Demobilization and Reintegration Program (DRP) launched by the Colombian government in 2002 provided a window of opportunity to collect systematic data on a variety of aspects of this conflict. Conducting a survey with the former fighters that joined this program about their experiences as civilians, combatants, and demobilized fighters allowed for gathering empirical evidence to research different aspects of the conflict, as well as of the demobilization and reintegration process.

From a methodological standpoint, the Colombian case provides an added advantage: in addition to the DRP, peace negotiations conducted between the government and the main paramilitary factions led to the “collective demobilization” of about 30,000 ex-combatants of these groups. Unlike the individuals participating in the DRP on an individual basis, who deserted their units, the “collectively demobilized” (CD) did not have to make an individual choice. This variation provides a unique opportunity to study the determinants of demobilization among former paramilitary fighters (Arjona and Kalyvas 2009a). In addition,

^{*} We would like to thank the Colombian Ministry of Interior and Justice, and the Ministry of Defense for allowing us to conduct this survey in 2004 and 2005. We especially thank the staff of the PRD in Bogota, and the Opportunity and Reference Centers of the cities of Cúcuta and Montería for their invaluable collaboration and support. We would like [†]This survey has received financial support from the Program on Order, Conflict and Violence at Yale University, the US Institute of Peace, and the Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden. We are grateful with these institutions for their support.

¹ This situation has changed in the last few years. Since 2004 a group of researchers have conducted surveys with ex-combatants and civilians in several African countries that are undergoing civil war such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi and Uganda, as well as in Aceh and Nepal.

it allows for assessing whether there is a systematic bias in the responses of individually demobilized combatants (ID); we do so elsewhere by comparing CD paramilitaries to ID paramilitaries (Arjona and Kalyvas 2009b).

More substantially, the Colombian case is extremely interesting because it entails a complex set of phenomena that have been under study in different literatures dealing with civil war: guerrilla war, natural resources (cocaine and puppy seeds), emergence of paramilitary groups, violence against civilians, massive displacement, failed peace processes, several demobilization programs, and complex relations between armed groups and state personnel and politicians. Given these facts, studying the Colombian conflict can produce very valuable theoretical analysis and empirical evidence, which not only help us to better understand its particularities, but also the dynamics of other conflicts. On the other hand, precisely because of the duration of the conflict and its negative impact on the civilian population, it is essential to gather information that allows for documenting and analyzing these phenomena in greater detail.

We conducted a large-scale survey of ex-combatants in the summer of 2005, following a pilot survey in the summer of 2004. The survey includes both guerilla and paramilitary deserters and collectively demobilized paramilitaries. We completed 821 interviews with ex-combatants. In 2006 we implemented a control survey with 565 civilians. The data provide detailed and systematic evidence on a wide array of behaviors and dynamics occurring during the war, as well as on the demobilization and reintegration process.

This article provides an overview of the responses to key questions in our survey. We begin with a short description of the Colombian conflict and the DRP, and follow up with a description of the project and our methods. Section 2 presents the general characteristics of our respondents at the time when the survey was implemented. Section 3 covers the prewar profile of the ex-combatants: their socio-demographic characteristics, the families and communities where they come from, their stated motivation for joining, and their membership to different armed actors. Section 3 provides a description of the characteristics of the three main armed groups: the insurgent FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and ELN (National Liberation Army), and the counterinsurgent paramilitaries.² In this section we cover aspects of the internal organization of these groups and their relation to the civilian populations. Section 4 covers issues related to the uses of violence, the practices of denunciation and the dynamics of control. Section 5 covers responses related to the process of demobilization and reintegration. We conclude with a summary of findings and suggestions for new avenues of research.

² Referring to the 'paramilitaries' as if they were a unified group is not accurate since most of these groups emerged separately from each other and had a different structure. Yet, given the number of groups our respondents referred to we present all responses about paramilitary organizations together. All the paramilitary factions that we include formed a federal structure, the AUC or United Self-defenses of Colombia.

1. The Project

1.1 The Colombian Conflict and the Demobilization and Reintegration Program

The current Colombian conflict can be traced to a civil war called '*La Violencia*' ('Violence'), which occurred between 1949 and 1957. During that period, fighting between members of the two traditional parties (Liberal and Conservative) caused the death of around 200,000 people. Even though violence decreased following an agreement between the two parties, several guerrilla and bandit groups remained active. In the 1960s some of these groups, together with peasants dissatisfied with the slow agrarian reform promised by the government, disenchanted students and communist leaders, formed different revolutionary guerrilla groups including the FARC, the ELN, and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL). All of them embraced variants of Marxist ideology. For decades, these groups were only active in a few peripheral areas of the country and their military capacity was low. In the mid-seventies, however, most of them started to see in the illicit drugs industry a way to finance their operations and began to improve their military capacity and expand in new territories, taking advantage of Colombia's low state capacity outside the country's main urban centers. The use of techniques such as kidnapping and extortion to fund their operations provided additional resources, and affected regional elites across the country.³

As a reaction to the activities of the guerrillas, and as a way to preserve the status quo, local and regional elites began to form paramilitary armies. While a few were genuinely self-defense groups formed by peasants, most were formed by powerful landowners and emerald-traders. The national army, although not directly involved in the emergence of these groups, has been repeatedly accused of tolerating and abetting them (e.g. Romero 2003). The paramilitaries funded their operations with voluntary and forced contributions of landlords and firms as well as income derived from drug trafficking.

Since the late eighties the intensity of the armed conflict and the levels of violence increased at unprecedented rates, with encounters between guerrillas, paramilitaries, and the army growing more frequent and more deadly, and the total number of attacks by armed groups (including homicides, massacres, kidnappings, and other attacks) increasing steadily. The FARC emerged as the most powerful group with around 20-30,000 combatants, followed by the ELN with around 6,000 (Gutierrez 2003)—while smaller groups such as the EPL and the M-19 negotiated their demobilization with the government in the early nineties. Paramilitary groups also saw a tremendous expansion during the same period: by the end of the nineties they had recruited about 13,000 combatants (Sánchez and Chacón 2006).

Colombian governments signed various peace agreements since 1990⁴, which demobilized approximately 4,800 former combatants (Franco, 2000). The Colombian Government launched a voluntary demobilization program in 2002, that has so far attracted around 9,000 former members of the FARC, near 3,000 from paramilitary groups, and 1,200 from ELN⁵. The government also made peace negotiations with paramilitary leaders that led to the demobilization of 31,671 combatants of different groups united under the umbrella of the AUC (United Self-defense Forces of Colombia)⁶.

³ See for example, Aguilera (2006); Pizarro (2006); and Sánchez and Chacón (2006).

⁴ Eight groups have demobilized completely or in part within these agreements: M-19, EPL, PRT, Quintin Lame, CRS, Medellín Militas, Metropolitan Militas, Militas of Valle de Aburra, Francisco Garnica Front, and Ernesto Rojas Front.

⁵ Colombian Ministry of Defense (<http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/>).

⁶ Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, Colombia. http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/desmovilizaciones/2004/index_resumen.htm

1.2 The Survey

The survey was conducted in two stages. We first tested the viability of the project and the questionnaire by conducting a pilot survey in the summer of 2004. In the summer of 2005 we conducted the survey with 821 ex-combatants, of which 436 had demobilized voluntarily from the FARC (henceforth referred to as “IFARC”), ELN (“IELN”), and paramilitary groups (“IPARAS” or “IP”); furthermore, we conducted 387 interviews in the cities of Cúcuta and Montería, two medium-size cities in the north-west and the north-east of the country, with collectively demobilized ex-paramilitaries (“CPARAS” or “CP”)—i.e. those who did not make the choice of demobilizing, but did so upon their commanders gave the order to turn their weapons in.

The survey instrument was designed to gather evidence on three main areas: joining, group organization and practices, and demobilization; it includes 255 questions of which the majority are close-ended and a few are open-ended, which allowed us to collect both quantitative and qualitative evidence. Respondents were first told about the project, its goals, and the questionnaire. Participation was voluntary, and interviews lasted on average 1.5 hours.

1.3 Sample and limitations

The universe of cases of individually demobilized combatants was, at the time of the survey, 7,131. After leaving their organizations and joining the DRP, former fighters chose a city or town to settle in, and the government allocated them in a safe house in that place. More than half selected Bogota (56%), while most of the rest opted for other large cities and a few for rural areas. Ideally, our sample would have included demobilized fighters throughout the country. However, security issues as well as financial constraints prevented us from doing that. Given that 56% of all individually demobilized persons had chosen Bogota, we decided to select a random sample among those who were living there. Although we cannot control for potential differences between those who chose to move to Bogota as opposed to elsewhere, the wide variation in our respondents’ place of origin suggests that our sample includes ex-combatants from all over the country. In fact, the 439 IDEs in our sample came from around 185 different municipalities located in 28 of the 33 departments of the country.


To select our sample we randomly selected a set of safe homes where the ex-combatants lived. Given that newly demobilized fighters were assigned to safe homes according to availability of spots, and that there were no other criteria for assigning them to a specific safe house, the distribution of ex-combatants across safe houses can be considered to be random. We initially gave a short presentation of the project to all ex-combatants, and we then asked for their voluntary participation, which was over 95%. We targeted 17 safe houses randomly selected out of 32, and conducted 315 interviews.

Due to security issues, we were forced to stop our visits to safe houses.⁷ We completed 124 additional interviews at a public office that handled all requests and paperwork of the IDEs. All beneficiaries of the Reintegration Program had to visit these offices in order to solve a variety of issues related to their training, family situation, and job placement—which means that those who visit this facility do not share particular characteristics. We stratified our sample in order to over-represent former FARC members, given that all collectively demobilized fighters belonged to paramilitary groups. We randomly selected a number of former guerrilla and paramilitary beneficiaries every day, gave them a short presentation of the project, and asked for their voluntary participation in a private location. Again, participation was over 95%. We do not find any significant differences between the responses of the IDEs we interviewed in safe houses, and those interviewed at the public office.

⁷ On July 15 2005, a bomb exploded in front of one of the safe houses. The government then decided to close all the safe houses within a few weeks and relocate ex-combatants.

Data provided by the Ministry of Defense in December 2005 suggest that our sample is representative of the population of IDE in terms of group membership (Figure 1.1). The sample mirrors group membership of the population of IDE in the case of the ELN and Other Guerrillas. FARC ex-combatants are slightly overrepresented and paramilitaries are slightly underrepresented, since we oversampled FARC members in the last run of interviews, as we explained before. On the other hand, according to the data of the Ministry of Defense 86% of all IDEs are men, and 13% are women. For reasons that remain unclear, women are underrepresented in our survey, as only 8% of interviewed IDEs were women.

Figure 1.1



Even though we are confident about the quality of our sample of individually demobilized combatants, it is important to stress that it is not representative of the universe of guerrilla combatants in Colombia, since respondents are selected from the population of combatants who voluntarily joined a demobilization program. Given that the FARC and ELN have not signed a peace agreement to demobilize its fighters in the recent past, it was impossible to identify a representative sample of fighters of these organizations who had not demobilized. This fact implies that our generalizations about the FARC and the ELN have limitations: we may have interviewed the young, uncommitted and dissatisfied members of the FARC. However, given the large numbers of persons who have demobilized from these groups—so far close to 13,000 of FARC and 2,000 of ELN⁸, which are said to correspond to between 35% and 50% of their number of troops by 2000—we believe that our respondents do not represent the views of a small portion of these organizations, and hence their responses do provide valuable information. Furthermore, some of our findings can be crosschecked with existing aggregated data at the municipality level as well as qualitative and ethnographic data. An additional way in which the data will allow us to assess biases is by comparing interviewees' responses about groups they didn't join: we asked many questions about all armed groups the respondents interacted with as civilians, i.e. before they enlisted, and these responses give us a sense of the bias in the responses of those talking about the group to which they belonged. Overall, however, caution is needed when making claims about the FARC and ELN based on the data included in this report.

⁸ Data as reported by Colombia's High Commission for Reintegration's website http://www.reintegracion.gov.co/Es/proceso_ddr/Paginas/balance.aspx [01-25-2010]

Turning to the CPARAS, the universe of this population consisted of 4,433 individuals at the time of the survey, living in seven towns or cities throughout the country. We decided to focus on two paramilitary factions: the Cordoba Bloc and the Catatumbo Bloc, whose former fighters were living mostly in the cities (or nearby locations) of Montería and Cúcuta, respectively.⁹ At that time, 925 fighters had demobilized from the Cordoba Bloc, and 1,425 from the Catatumbo Bloc.¹⁰ Given that CPARAS did not live in safe houses but in independent homes, and since their contact information was highly protected, we had to rely on the cooperation of the local offices of the Ministry of Interior in both cities. Through them, we invited about 500 ex-combatants to attend a meeting at a secure place, without giving any information on the purpose of such meeting. To our surprise, around 400 out of the 500 came and, after attending a presentation on the project, 99% agreed to participate in the survey. Even though we cannot control for the possible bias derived from the fact that respondents had to select themselves to attend, the fact that only 20% refused to come and that they did not know about the purpose of the meeting makes us confident about the sample. We interviewed 162 former fighters of the Catatumbo Bloc (11% of the entire population), and 222 of the Cordoba Bloc (24% of the entire population).

As with any other survey, the responses of former combatants could be affected by a number of problems due to memory, motivation, or communication issues (e.g. Sudman and Bradburn 1982). We tried to minimize these in designing our questionnaire, for example by trying not to ask about the frequency of events or their specific timing. Yet, we are aware that survey data have limitations, and it should be complemented with other evidence such as observational data, in-depth interviews and archives. Finally, given the length of the questionnaire, boredom and tiredness could affect responses. However, both in the pilot and large-scale surveys we asked respondents to assess the questionnaire at the end and their experience of it and 95% of all IDE and 97% of all CPARAS gave positive feedback. To our enumerators' surprise, many respondents even wanted to talk more about their experiences after two hours of being interviewed.

2. General characteristics of the respondents

Figure 2.1 presents respondents by group membership at the time of demobilization, differentiating between individually demobilized and collectively demobilized. As mentioned before, only paramilitaries have demobilized collectively; hence, we only interviewed individually demobilized ex-combatants in the case of guerrilla groups. About half of our sample consists of CPARAS, consisting mainly of former members of the Catatumbo Bloc and the Cordoba Bloc. The other half is composed mainly by IFARC, IELN, and IPARAS. A small percentage fought in dissident guerrilla groups (1%) and only two respondents—both IDEs—did not report their group affiliation when responding the survey.¹¹ Given that very few ex-combatants come from guerrilla groups other than the ELN and the FARC, our presentation of the data will focus on these two guerrilla groups, the IPARAS, and the paramilitaries of the Cordoba and Catatumbo Blocs¹².


⁹ Even though we focus on these two factions, our sample is drawn from the cities where almost half of all CPARAS were living at that time: 32% were in Montería, and 13% in Cúcuta.

¹⁰ Séptimo informe trimestral del secretario general al consejo permanente sobre la misión de apoyo al proceso de paz en Colombia (MAPP-OEA) <http://www.mapp-oea.org/documentos/informes/Trimestrales%20MAPP/7mo%20inf-colombia-MAPP.pdf>

¹¹ We exclude these two interviewees from the analysis in the remaining of the article.


¹² We are aware of the differences that may exist across paramilitary factions. Yet, in order to provide an overall view of the results of this survey, we present the data of the individually demobilized paramilitaries aggregated for this warring side. We do present the data for collectively demobilized paramilitaries by bloc.

Figure 2.1




Turning to age, our sample is young: about half of all respondents are between ages 18 and 25, and about 80% are less than 35. They have spent on average 5 years fighting (Figure 2.2). The time of service of those between 18 and 25 is shown in greater detail in Figure 2.3: about 75% spent more than 3 years fighting, while only 24% spent less than 2 years.¹³

Figure 2.2



¹³ Only 3% do not report the time they spent fighting. These observations are not included in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.3



The average time of service does not vary greatly across armed organizations: for all groups it is between 4 and 6 years. This pattern is consistent with the data of the Ministry of Defense on the entire population of IDE that had demobilized when the survey was conducted. The CPARAS have spent on average fewer years fighting.

3. Ex-combatants' profile and recruitment


This section presents responses to questions on ex-combatants' lives before joining any armed group organization. We asked about personal, family, and community characteristics, including the respondents' relations with combatants when they were civilians. We start with their socio-demographic profiles, then report findings about contextual factors—including their families, local communities, and victimization—and end with responses that ask directly about recruitment.¹⁴

3.1 Socio-demographic profile

A first difference between those who joined either side is in their place of residence at the time of joining. As expected, guerrilla groups are more successful in recruiting in rural areas than the paramilitaries, whose recruits come mostly from urban areas (Figure 3.1). This difference is significant at the 1% level. It should be noted, however, that many towns in Colombia don't have the characteristics that are often associated with the term 'urban': towns are typically small and often only a few national institutions are present, while some public utilities are inaccessible to some, sometimes most, residents.


¹⁴ We exclude from the analysis 25 respondents who belonged to both guerrilla and paramilitary groups. We do this because it is a small number of persons, and the treating them as a special category depending on their demobilization type (i.e. individually or collectively) *and* the group they originally joined unnecessarily complicates the figures. However, we do not find any systematic differences in their responses.

Figure 3.1



Data on age at time of enlistment (Figure 3.2) show that these groups recruit mostly very young people. About 80% of those who belonged to a guerrilla group were under age 25 when they joined, and almost half were below 18. While the percentage of paramilitary recruits who joined before turning 25 is similar, the percentage of those who report joining at ages below 18 is smaller than among former guerrilla fighters. However, there are statistically significant differences (at the 1% level) between the responses of CPARAS and IPARAS: while only 20% of the former reported joining at ages below 18, 38% of the IPARAS did. This result may suggest that younger recruits are more willing to desert. However, it might also be that those who did not demobilize voluntarily tend to describe the group to which they belonged in a more positive way than those who deserted. Given the condemnation to recruiting minors—both in Colombia and elsewhere—it is possible that the CPARAS who joined before they turned 18 did not report so. This difference may also indicate differences in recruitment by different paramilitary factions. Hence, this result must be taken with caution. It is also surprising that while less 1% of CCordoba and none of CCatatumbo report joining at ages below 14, 8% of IPARAS do so (the difference is also significant at 1%). Once again, this could signal either a problem of underreporting, or a tendency to desert among those who enlist at very young ages. According to the data, FARC and ELN are the groups with the highest percentage of recruits under age 13 (11% and 10% respectively). If young recruits are more likely to become deserters, this result may not be representative of the universe of FARC recruits. At the same time, FARC is the group with the greatest percentage of ex-combatants reporting having joined at ages above 25. Given that the FARC and the ELN have been fighting for a similar time period, it could hardly be argued that the differences between the two are due to the passing of time.

Figure 3.2



In terms of education, close to half of all respondents did some years of elementary school or completed it (figure 3.3). Guerrilla members are less likely than paramilitaries to have attended secondary education (the difference is statistically significant at 1%). Very few of the recruits of both sides attended college or received professional training; the percentages are greater among IPARAS than CPARAS (difference significant at 1%). On average, ex-guerrilla fighters are less educated than paramilitaries, which might be an outcome of the difference in the groups' base in terms of rural vs. urban areas.

Figure 3.3





Figure 3.4 shows respondents' occupation at time of enlistment. Contrary to what could be expected, only a few respondents report being unemployed and looking for a job at that time (less than 3% in all groups). Interestingly, employed persons—even coca gatherers who usually earn much more money than what they would in any other manual job¹⁵—decided to enlist even in the guerrilla groups that do not pay any salaries to their combatants. It should be mentioned, however, that among those who were employed the majority had temporary jobs, which are usually precarious and underpaid. Also, as will be mentioned later, several indicators suggest that ex-combatants do come from poor backgrounds with few opportunities. Nevertheless, their opportunity costs do not appear to have been as desperate as often posited in the literature that claims greed to be the overriding motivation for joining armed organizations.

Figure 3.4



3.2 Contextual Factors

The survey asked about different characteristics of the families and communities in which our respondents lived. Below we present results regarding family income, and several indicators of state presence, armed group influence, politics, and violence in the localities where the respondents lived one year prior to joining an illegal armed group for the first time.

Family and networks

Figure 3.5 shows respondents' answer to the question: "Please think of the locality where you lived most part of your life before you enlisted. If you were to divide the people in that locality among rich, middle class, or poor, how would you categorize your family?" As could be expected most respondents said they came from poor families and few identified their families as rich. Yet, IPARAS are more likely than others to say that their families were rich, and less likely to say that they were poor (these differences are significant at 1%). They are also more likely than CCordoba and CCatatumbo to report having a middle class background. No significant differences exist between CPARAS and former guerrillas.

¹⁵ About 8% of IFARC and 15% of IELN report being coca gatherers prior to joining these groups. The percentage is below 2% for all former paramilitary members.

Figure 3.5






Figure 3.6 presents respondents who said that someone in their families worked as a coca gatherer before they enlisted. Percentages are certainly high, especially in the case of the IFARC and the IELN. This result may be an artifact of the capacity of the guerrillas to recruit mostly in rural areas, while the paramilitaries are better at recruiting in urban areas. Hence, while these responses could be used as an indicator of presence of armed groups in areas where coca is produced, these results do not allow for such generalizations. In fact, there is abundant anecdotal evidence of the presence of both sides of the conflict in areas where coca grows.

Figure 3.6



Networks seem to play a role in motivating recruitment as about a half of all respondents report having at least one relative or friend who joined their group before they did (Figure 3.7).

Figure 3.7



Local community

Turning to community-level factors, respondents were asked about the level of division in their community one year prior to joining, along their preferences over armed groups. Their responses indicate that recruitment is not the result of polarization at the local level (Figure 3.8). To be sure, this does not imply that there are no strong divisions of interests, and diverse political identities. However, the survey results do suggest that those who join armed groups do not perceive the populations of their localities as strongly divided along their affiliations with the different armed actors.

Figure 3.8




Table 3.1 presents a summary of state presence in the locality where the respondent lived one year before enlisting in an armed organization. As can be expected given the different distribution of combatants across rural and urban areas in each group, ex-paramilitaries are more likely to come from areas where greater state presence exists. The isolation of many areas where guerrillas find recruits becomes evident by looking at the percentage of ex-combatants who lived in localities that had a paved road: only about a third of those who joined the FARC or the ELN did.

Table 3.1

State presence and infrastructure in respondent's locality one year prior to enlistment	Group membership and demobilization type				
	IFARC	IELN	IPARAS	CCordoba	CCatatumbo
Police	47%	57%	75%	80%	81%
Army	48%	58%	70%	70%	68%
Health Center	8%	86%	86%	91%	81%
School	95%	96%	95%	96%	93%
Access to public pone (within 30 mts.)	65%	71%	76%	78%	76%
Paved road	21%	36%	63%	62%	53%
Agrarian Bank	41%	60%	65%	60%	64%

Table 3.2 shows presence of illegal groups in respondents' place of residence one year before enlisting in an armed group. Several patterns emerge from these data. First, recruits come from localities with high presence of illegal organizations. Second, ex-combatants of each group are likely to come from localities where this group was *already* present before they decided to join it. At least one guerrilla group is present in about 90% of localities where ex-guerrilla respondents lived, while paramilitaries were present only in about 30% of these localities. In the case of former paramilitaries, while paramilitary groups were present in 66% of their home towns, guerrilla groups were present in about 50% of these localities (these differences are significant at the 1% level).

Table 3.2

Presence of illegal armed groups in locality one year prior to enlistment	Group membership and demobilization type				
	IFARC	IELN	IPARAS	CCordoba	CCatatumbo
FARC presence	91%	77%	50%	39%	25%
ELN presence	23%	82%	22%	37%	15%
Paramilitary presence	28%	33%	79%	59%	66%

Figure 3.9 presents again armed groups' presence in respondents' localities one year before enlistment by group membership. This figure shows which groups ex-combatants interacted with before enlisting. The first point to observe is that only about 10% of the recruits, across all groups, come from localities where no armed groups were present. Less than 5% of the guerrilla members come from areas where only paramilitaries were present, and less than 15% of all ex-paramilitaries come from localities where only guerrillas were present. These results suggest that, contrary to a commonly held view, recruitment does not occur throughout the country and is locally focalized. More than 90% of all of those who join a guerrilla group did so while living in an area where one of such groups were present, and more than 60% of those who joined the paramilitaries did so in areas subjected to their presence. About 60% of all ex-guerrilla fighters lived in areas where only guerrilla groups were present, and about 30% in areas where both paramilitaries and guerrillas were present. In the case of the paramilitaries the percentage of ex-combatants coming from areas where only paramilitaries were present is smaller (around 25%), perhaps because paramilitary groups are usually located in areas with some prior influence of guerrillas. The latter, on the contrary, still occupy—at least when our respondents enlisted—some areas of the country where paramilitary groups had not consolidated their presence. Further analysis would be required in order to see if ex-paramilitaries are more likely to come from areas where the paramilitary groups have expelled the guerrillas, or from areas where both still compete for control.

Figure 3.9





Figure 3.10 shows the amount of time that guerrilla and paramilitary groups spent in respondents' localities and suggests that armed groups' presence tended to be permanent in these locations: for half of the respondents combatants stayed in the locality all day and night, and for about 20% of the respondents, combatants were present several times a week.

Figure 3.10



We also wanted to get at the vexing question of “popular support” for armed groups. We asked our respondents about their perception of their community’s feeling towards the groups that were present in their locality. Several patterns emerge from these responses: first, respondents tend to remember their communities liking more the group they belonged to than others, as expected; however, at most 50% of all respondents of each group said that most people were happy with the presence of their group in the area. Also, many recognized that people’s feelings were divided about the group they eventually joined, as well as other groups. Finally, as expected, IPARAS and CPARAS are more likely to remember people in their communities disliking the guerrillas, and IFARC and IELN are more likely to remember people disliking the paramilitaries. Overall, respondents are more prone to report negative feelings towards rival groups than positive feelings towards the group they belonged to.

Table 3.3 shows the respondents’ assessment of how important were different persons in the localities where they lived before enlisting. The first pattern that emerges in this table is that respondents of all groups remember the combatants of the group that they ended up joining as being very important persons in their localities; in contrast, they don’t remember members of groups they did not join as being very important: guerrilla combatants are thought to be very important by most ex-guerrilla respondents while not by ex-paramilitaries, and vice-versa. However, it is worth noting that the percentage of paramilitaries who identify guerrilla combatants as important people is not dismissible: around 14% do. The same applies to ex-guerrilla fighters: about 10% remember paramilitaries being highly influential in their communities. Overall, these results point to a strong link between recruitment and the local dynamics of the war.

More than half of all respondents consider civilian leaders to be important persons. The ex-combatants’ assessment of the importance of priests is quite surprising: overall, priests turn out being remembered as very important actors—in some cases more than mayors. Finally, the wealthy are considered to be more important by paramilitaries than by guerrillas as could be expected; however, the difference between IFARC and former paramilitaries is not very large and is not statistically significant.

Table 3.3. Important or influential people in respondents’ community prior to enlisting

	Group Membership				
	IFARC	IELN	IParas	CCordoba	CCatatumbo
A guerrilla combatant	64%	51%	15%	17%	7%
A paramilitary combatant	10%	13%	55%	39%	43%
A civilian leader of the community	62%	37%	42%	59%	52%
The mayor	51%	37%	59%	66%	67%
The priest	57%	54%	53%	68%	77%
The wealthy	45%	30%	52%	50%	70%

Victimization

Another result that points to the endogeneity of recruitment to the dynamics of the war is that ex-combatants of all groups come from highly victimized families and networks: many report having relatives or friends killed, threatened, or displaced by armed groups before they joined one of them (Figure 3.11). In addition, respondents come from areas that are, on average, more violent than national averages. About half of all respondents remember armed groups perpetrating homicides one year before they enlisted, and about a third say they also committed massacres (Figure 3.12). A comparison between our respondents’ communities and the national average confirms the insight that these were unusually violent places to begin with: in 1999, when most of our respondents joined an armed group for the first time, while the

national homicide rate was 54, the average in these communities was 85; likewise, while at least one massacre took place in 78% of these communities between 1997 and 2000, the national proportion is 18% for the same period¹⁶.

Figure 3.11





Figure 3.12



¹⁶ Based on data reported by Colombia's National Police.

3.3 Recruitment

Motivation

Turning to recruitment, respondents were asked the following question: “Please try to remember the days before you enlisted. How would you best describe your beliefs about the step you were going to take?” Each answer was read, and the respondent could select as many as applied. As expected, most ex-paramilitaries didn’t see paramilitary groups as revolutionary organizations but close to half of the guerrillas did—even though ideology does not seem to play the role that the literature often assumes it does (Table 3.4)

Table 3.4

	IFARC	IELN	Iparas	CCordoba	CCatatumbo
Was going to join a revolutionary group	35%	49%	6%	6%	7%
Was going to join a group to defend society	31%	49%	41%	58%	42%
Was going to have a better life as a combatant	39%	41%	35%	43%	47%
Thought was doing a small commitment and would go home soon	30%	30%	30%	33%	27%
Was a quick decision	37%	21%	31%	37%	32%
Was forced	7%	3%	8%	0.4%	0%

Table 3.5 presents respondents’ stated motivation for enlistment. We coded this response in three different ways: first, we asked interviewees to talk about the reasons they had to join (as an open-ended question); second, based on their answer, the interviewer coded the response using a list of 13 possible motivations; and third, the interviewer asked the respondent about the most important reasons he or she had to join from that list of motivations, and coded the response. We allowed for more than one answer. Table 3.5 presents the response as given by the respondent when asked whether or not each item of the list played a key role in his or her decision.

Table 3.5. Motivations for recruitment

	IFARC	IELN	IPARAS	CCordoba	CCatatumbo
Ideology	12%	30%	9%	16%	17%
Revenge	7%	13%	14%	20%	14%
Attracted by promise of money or goods	23%	20%	40%	55%	60%
Escape from domestic violence	4%	5%	3%	1.4%	0%
Escape from extreme poverty	9%	5%	5%	14%	24%
Power	12%	5%	9%	4%	7%
To be someone in his community	7%	7%	5%	5%	2%
Because he (she) thought it was going to be an adventure. For fun.	11%	15%	11%	9%	12%
Because his friends had joined before	8%	0%	5%	2%	2%
Forcedly recruited	10%	3%	11%	0.4%	0%
Running away from a threat	5%	7%	4%	0.4%	0%
Allure of weapons	7%	8%	6%	9%	7%

Several patterns emerge from these results. First, ideology is not stronger among guerrilla recruits in general as compared to the paramilitaries (16% and 14% respectively, a statistically non-significant

difference). Despite the fact that guerrillas do not pay salaries or other material compensations to their members while the paramilitaries do, recruits from both sides of the conflict do not differ in their likelihood to enlist due to ideology. Turning to the different organizations, the differences between the FARC and the IPARAS is small and not statistically significant, and the CPARAS are slightly more inclined to report ideology as a motivation than FARC recruits (the difference is not statistically significant). On the other hand, the IELN do report ideology as a key motivation more often than all other ex-combatants (the differences are significant at the 1% level). These patterns, however, may not reflect the entire make up of guerrilla groups in Colombia given that our sample only includes guerrilla deserters. Finally, the difference between the IPARAS and CPARAS, although small, is significant at the 5% level. This may suggest, once again, that deserters were less likely to be ideologically motivated than CPARAS, or that the latter attempt to portray the groups they belonged to as composed by politically motivated individuals. It might also be that the Cordoba and Catatumbo Blocs were able to attract slightly more ideologically motivated individuals than other factions in the country.

Revenge is a leading motivation for about 13% of all respondents; most of these interviewees see an event of violence as the key determinant of their decision to enlist. FARC members are less likely than all other interviewees to report revenge as a leading motivation (the difference is significant at 1% with CPARAS and 5% with IPARAS). Material benefits is a strong motivation for about 25% of all IDE and 57% of the CPARAS. Given that the FARC and the ELN do not offer economic rewards or salaries to combatants, a greater anticipation of such benefit among the paramilitaries is expected. CPARAS are more likely to join motivated by these rewards than IPARAS (the difference is statistically significant at 1% level). This difference may imply that desertion is not principally caused by failed material promises. Given that CPARAS are also more likely to report ideology as a key motivation to join, these results point to the multiplicity of reasons that may lead a person to enlist in an organization of this type.¹⁷

Although only a few respondents mentioned domestic violence as a key reason to enlist, the fact that around 3% of all respondents saw in joining an armed group the way to avoid being harmed at home is revealing about available possibilities for youths in these rural areas. Although only 7% identified “desire to gain power” as a key motivation for joining, many more mentioned it explicitly in their answer to the open-ended question about their motivation to enlist. Given that most recruits are adolescents when they join this result is not surprising. The desire of being someone in one’s community was mentioned by about the same number of respondents who mentioned power as a motivation. Enlisting based on the expectation of having adventure or fun was identified as a key motivation by 11% of IFARC and paramilitary ex-combatants, and 15% of IELN. These numbers are very high if one takes into consideration the hardship involved in becoming a combatant. Yet, again, given the ages at which most respondents enlisted this could reveal how youths think about combatants in regions where the groups make a strong presence. About 5% of all respondents said they joined as a way to seek protection or running away from a threat. This includes persons who were threatened by other armed organizations but also some who had private disputes. Finally, it is worth noting that only 5% of all respondents said they were forcedly recruited. Especially in the case of the ID, it could be expected that many respondents preferred to excuse their participation in an armed group in this way. This result, together with responses given to other sensitive questions, gives us confidence about the attitude of the majority of our interviewees towards responding the survey.

About 7% of our respondents mentioned other factors as key motivations in their decision to join. Close to 8% mention the allure of the weapons as a clear motivation to enlist. For 7% of the IPARAS, their decision was the result of deceit, which may explain their desertion. An impressive 3% of the former guerrillas joined


¹⁷ It is worth noting that half of the CPARAS who report ideology as a motivation to join also report material incentives.

to be with their loved one. Almost 2% of the former paramilitaries and 1% of ex-guerrillas say that they joined these groups because they were rejected by the National Army.

Trajectories


About 10% of those who demobilized from a guerrilla group report having fought in another legal or illegal armed group before they joined the group from which they eventually deserted (Figure 3.13). The rate is higher among IPARAS, and even higher among CCordoba and CCatatumbo. These differences between former guerrillas, IPARAS and CPARAS are all statistically significant. These data include enlisting in different organizations of the same side (i.e. persons who joined different paramilitary or guerrilla groups), and those who had previously served in the National Army and the National Police.

Figure 3.13



Of those who belonged to more than one group, most were members of the national army or the police and later on of the paramilitaries (Figure 3.14). These data include those who served the mandatory military training. It is worth mentioning that in the open questions, several ex-combatants declared having joined an illegal group after failing to join the National Army or the Police. The data (not shown) also suggest that moving across guerrilla groups is uncommon, as it is among paramilitary factions.

Figure 3.14



4. Characteristics of armed groups


In this section we present a subset of results on the internal organization of the armed groups from which our respondents demobilized.¹⁸

4.1 Internal Organization

As expected, almost all respondents report having received military training. The FARC and ELN appear to provide some scholastic training and to teach some fighters about management, but the difference between them and the paramilitaries—although statistically significant—is not as important as one would expect (Figure 4.1). A major difference between groups emerges, however, when it comes to the group’s investment in ideological resources. Overall, former guerrillas are more likely to receive ideological training than the paramilitaries (the difference is significant at 5%), and report attending meetings about the group’s political and ideological objectives much more frequently than the paramilitaries.


¹⁸ In these questions we asked about the group from which the person had recently demobilized. Hence, the results are shown by group of demobilization, as opposed to by group of first enlistment (differentiating between collectively and individually demobilized respondents).

Figure 4.1



Ideological indoctrination, however, does not appear to produce a notably different perception of agreement with the group's ideology (Figure 4.2 and 4.2b). In all groups, most former combatants report either generalized agreement, or at least mixed agreement. Surprisingly, ex-paramilitaries are more likely to perceive a greater level of agreement with the group's ideology in their ranks than former guerrillas. This could be, of course, due to the absence of non-deserters in our sample of ex-guerrilla fighters. There are, in fact, statistically significant differences between CPARAS and IPARAS: the former report higher levels of agreement in their ranks. Either deserters underemphasize ideological agreement among their comrades, or the collectively demobilized feel the obligation to overemphasize internal agreement with the group's ideology.


Figure 4.2



No significant differences appear in terms of perceptions about internal promotion. All fighters emphasize good fighting ability and discount personal relations with the commander, though FARC and ELN fighters, along with IPARAS stress education more than CPARAS. The collectively demobilized paramilitaries also discount popularity.

All respondents emphasize their group's iron discipline. When a combatant stole from a civilian or, worse, killed one without being ordered to do so, he was almost always punished, respondents say (Figure 4.3). Rape by a combatant is a particular sensitive issue according to the respondents. About 85% reported not knowing a combatant who had raped a civilian. The percentage of IPARAS who do remember at least one case is higher than among both other IDE and CPARAS

Figure 4.3




Rapists were punished, our respondents report, though the great majority of interviewees across groups did not respond to this question since they said they never knew about a case of rape). Once again, CPARAS are less likely to report internal misconduct, as according to them all cases were punished; 15% of IPARAS, on the contrary, report knowing of a case where the commanders knew about the abuse, but did not punish the perpetrator.

4.2 Relations with Civilians

Another difference between the groups is the extent to which units relied on the local population for the procurement of food. The paramilitaries were much less likely to do so (12%) than the guerrillas (41%). All groups were concerned with the imposition of clear rules of behavior and order in at least some of the areas where they were present. Punishments for disobedience of different rules among civilians vary greatly depending on the behavior, as Figure 4.4 shows.

Figure 4.4. Punishments for disobedience of rules established by armed group



5. Conclusion

The results of this survey with 821 ex-combatants of guerrilla and paramilitary groups allow us to identify a few general patterns of recruitment, the internal organization of these groups and the demobilization and reinsertion process.

To start with, the profile of the interviewees before joining an armed group for the first time suggest several patterns of recruitment:

1. Recruitment does not take place throughout the national territory. It seems to be, rather, endogenous to the dynamics of the conflict, in particular to the presence of the armed groups. Those who enter an illegal armed organization usually live in areas where that organization has been present. The survey does not suggest that an important percentage of the recruits look for the armed organizations outside of their place of residence—as it is often claimed, especially when generalizations are made from the social movements literature.
2. All the armed groups, both guerrilla and paramilitary, recruit mostly young people: around 80% join at ages below 25. However, the guerrillas seem to be more prone to recruit minors than the paramilitaries. This may be, however, an artifact of the absence of non-deserters in the sample of former guerrilla fighters.

3. Recruitment is not linked to the conflict between the traditional parties. Even though this result is not surprising to any student of the Colombian conflict, it is an interesting result given the recent political history of the country. The survey results also fail to show that local conflicts based on affiliations with the different armed groups explain the individual decision to join a particular group.
4. The results suggest that those who join armed groups come from highly victimized areas, communities, and families. Threats, killings, and displacements are common among the families and social networks of the ex-combatants at the time when they joined an armed group.
5. The armed groups had a strong influence on the communities where the ex-combatants lived before they decided to enlist. This result points, once again, to the endogeneity of recruitment to the local dynamics of conflict.
6. Material interest does not explain the decision to enlist as the dominant literature in the last years suggests. While an important percentage of the interviewees identify the promise of goods as a motivation to enlist, the evidence does not suggest that joining an armed group can be compared to finding a good job which offers a good balance between costs and benefits. The evidence also fails to support the hypothesis according to which recruitment in armed conflicts is motivated solely by the desire to fight against injustice and grievances. To be sure, this is a motivation to some, but not for the majority and certainly not the only relevant motivation.
7. Both the guerrilla and paramilitary groups have a heterogeneous group of combatants regarding their motivations to enlist. This result points to the existence of multiple recruiting strategies and 'routes of entry'.

There are, however, some statistically significant differences between the responses of the individually and collectively demobilized paramilitaries. Overall, the collectively demobilized portray the organizations to which they belonged as more disciplined, less involved in criminal acts (like recruiting minors) and more ideological. The individually demobilized, on the other hand, are more likely to report misbehaviors by their former organizations.

Regarding the internal organization of the groups, the results suggest that, as can be expected, both the guerrilla and paramilitary groups subject their combatants to military training. We don't know, however, whether there are important differences in the intensity of such training, neither in the demands that the different organizations make to their recruits within that training. On the other hand, even though all the groups devote some time to provide ideological training to their recruits, there are important differences as the guerrilla groups give much more importance to it than the paramilitaries.

The demobilized fighters of all groups remember being ruled by strict norms of behavior and describe their commanders as those who were promoted due to their skills (such as intelligence and capacity in combat), and not for having personal ties with the commanders.

References

Aguilera, Mario, 2006. "ELN: Entre las Armas y la Política." In Gutiérrez (2006).

Arjona, Ana 2009. "One National War, Multiple Local Orders: An Inquiry into the Unit of Analysis of War and Post-war Interventions". En M. Bergsmo y P. Kalmanovitz (Eds), *Law in Peace Negotiations*. Forthcoming. Oslo: Torkel Psahl Academic Publisher.

Arjona, Ana and Stathis Kalyvas. 2007. "Rebelling Against Rebellion: Comparing Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Recruitment". Working paper.

Arjona, Ana and Stathis Kalyvas. 2008. "How Different are Deserters from Non-deserters? Assessing the Bias in Survey Responses of Demobilized Combatants in Colombia". Working paper.

Bottia, Marta 2003. "La presencia y expansión municipal de las FARC: es avaricia y contagio, mas que ausencia estatal". *CEDE Working Paper 2/2003*.

Collier, P. 1999, "On the Economic Consequences of Civil War", *Oxford Economic Papers*, 51: 168-83.

Collier, P. y Hoeffler, A., 2000. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War", Working Paper, World Bank.

Cubides *et ál.*, "La violencia y el municipio colombiano 1980-1997", Bogotá, Facultad de Ciencias Humanas, Universidad Nacional, Colección CES, 1998.

Cubides, F., "Los Paramilitares y su Estrategia", Deas Malcolm y María Victoria Llorente (comps.), *Reconocer la guerra para construir la paz*", Bogotá, Ediciones Uniandes, 1999.

Cubides, F. *Burocracias Armadas*. Bogotá: Norma. 2005.

Deas, M. y Llorente, M. V. (comps.), *Reconocer la guerra para construir la paz*, Bogotá, Ediciones Uniandes, 1999.

Echandía, C., *El conflicto armado y las manifestaciones de violencia en las regiones de Colombia*, Bogotá, Presidencia de la República, 1999a.

Echandía, C., "Expansión territorial de las guerrillas colombianas: geografía, economía y violencia". *Reconocer la guerra para construir la paz*", Malcolm Deas y María Victoria Llorente (comps.), Bogotá, Ediciones Uniandes, 1999b.

Elbadawi I. y Sambanis, N., "External Intervention and the Duration of Civil Wars", Working Paper 2433, World Bank Policy Research (Septiembre), 2000a.

Fearon, James, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 41, núm. 3, 2004, pp. 275-302.

Fearon, J. y Laitin, D., "Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war", *American Political Science Review* 97, 2003.

Franco, Carlos, 2000. "Apuntes a la Reinserción Económica: Diez Años de Supervivencia a la Crisis de la Economía y de la Paz". In *De Las Armas a la Democracia*, Vol. I. Bogota: Instituto Luis Carlos Galán.

González, Fernan, Ingrid Bolívar y Teófilo Forero. *Violencia Política en Colombia. De la nación fragmentada a la construcción del Estado*. Bogotá: Cinep. 2001.

Grossman, H., "Insurrections", K. Hartley, T. Sandler (eds.), *Handbook of Defense Economics*, Elsevier 1995.

Gutierrez, Francisco, 2008. "Telling the Difference: Guerrillas and Paramilitaries in the Colombian War". *Politics and Society* 36(3).

Gutierrez, Francisco, 2003a. "Recruitment in a civil war: a preliminary discussion of the Colombian Case". Paper presented at the Santa Fe Institute.

Gutierrez, Francisco, 2003b. "Criminal rebels? A discussion of war and criminality from the Colombian experience" Working Paper no. 27 *Crisis States Program*, London School of Economics.

Gutiérrez, Francisco, Maria E. Wills O and Gonzalo Sánchez (Eds.), 2006. *Nuestra Guerra Sin Nombre. Transformaciones del Conflicto en Colombia*. Bogotá, Grupo Editorial Norma.

Ibáñez, Ana Maria and Carlos Eduardo Vélez, 2008. "Civil Conflict and Forced Migration: The Micro Determinants and Welfare Losses of Displacement in Colombia," *World Development*, vol. 36(4), pp. 659-676.

Kalyvas, S. N., "Civil Wars", Carles Boix y Susan Stokes (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2007.

Levitt, S. and Rubio, M., 2005. "Understanding Crime in Colombia and What Can be Done About it", In A. Alesina (Ed) *Institutional Reforms The Case of Colombia*, MIT Press.

Offstein, Norman. "An Historical Review and Analysis of Colombian Guerrilla Movements". *CEDE Working Paper* 2003-21.

Peñate, Andrés. "El sendero estratégico del ELN: del idealismo guevarista al clientelismo armado", Deas Malcolm y María Victoria Llorente (comps.), *Reconocer la guerra para construir la paz*", Bogotá, Ediciones Uniandes, 1999.

Pizarro, Eduardo, 2006. "Las FARC-EP: ¿repliegue estratégico, debilitamiento o punto de inflexión?" In Gutierrez et al. (2006).

Rangel A., *Colombia: la guerra de fin de siglo*. Bogotá, Universidad de los Andes-Tercer Mundo, 1999.

Reyes, Alejandro, "Regionalización de los conflictos agrarios y la violencia política en Colombia", *Municipios y Regiones de Colombia: Una Mirada desde la Sociedad civil*. Bogotá, Fundación Social, 1999.

Romero, Mauricio, 2003. *Paramilitares y Autodefensas 1982-2003*. Bogotá: Planeta.

Rubio, M., "Violencia y conflicto en Colombia", Trabajo presentado en la conferencia "Crimen y violencia: causas y política de prevención", Bogotá, Universidad de los Andes y Banco Mundial, 2000.

Salamanca, Camila 2005. "Masacres en Colombia 1995-2002: ¿Violencia Indiscriminada o Racional?" Master thesis, Faculty of Economics, Los Andes University.

Sambanis, N. y Hegre, H., "Sensitivity Analysis of the Empirical Literature on Civil War Onset" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 50, núm. 4, 2006.

Sánchez, Fabio and Mario Chacon, 2006. "Conflicto, Estado y Descentralización: Del Progreso Social a la Disputa Armada por el Control Local, 1974-2002". In Gutiérrez et al. (2006).

Steele, Abbey, 2009. "Seeking Safety: Avoiding Displacement and Choosing Destinations in Civil Wars." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol 46, No. 3. 419-430.

Walter, Barbara, 1997. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement", *International Organization*, 51, (verano), pp. 335-64.

Vélez, M., 1999. "FARC-ELN. Evolución y Expansión territorial", *Documento de Trabajo CEDE 2000-08*, Bogotá, Universidad de los Andes.